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NOTES

the: Civil Code and is open to the further objection that, unless
the financial status of the plaintiff be also considered, the desired
end may not result. It is submitted that this apparent inconsistency between the doctrine disallowing exemplary damages and
the rule allowing recovery based upon the financial ability of the
wrongdoer may well be resolved by an abandonment of the latter
doctrine.
J.B.D.

PRACTICE OF LAW-USE OF STANDARD LEGAL FORM BY REAL

Es-

TATE BROKER PROHIBITED--A real estate broker selected from a
published legal form book and filled out a contract blank for two
customers to be used in the completion of a real estate transaction. Held, that this constitutes the practice of law and such
person must be duly licensed. In re Gore, 58 Ohio App. 79, 115
N.E. (2d) 968 (1937).
There is general agreement that the practice of law embraces
a wider field than the preparation of pleadings and court procedure. It also includes the drawing of various legal instruments
and the giving of advice upon legal matters.1 Borderline cases
usually involve the preparation or selection of instruments of a
legal character, and in solving such problems some courts seek to
determine whether the practice in question is a major portion of
the business engaged in or is only a necessary incident thereof.
Under this rule it has been held that the preparation of a bill of
sale for customers was incidental to the business, notwithstanding
that a fee was charged for the service.2 Other cases seem to lay
more emphasis on whether or not the alleged offender holds
himself out as doing legal work-thus a trust company has been
held to be engaged illegally in the practice of law where it advertised that it specialized in drawing contracts, deeds and mortgages.8 Again, whether or not the defendant is making profit on
the "law business" has also been used as a test.4 In whatever
words the test may be stated the cases generally seem to recog1. National Savings Bank of the District of Columbia v. William H.
Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199, 25 L.Ed. 621, 623 (1880); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
2. People v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666
(1919); reargument denied, 228 N.Y. 585, 127 N.E. 919 (1920).
3. In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157
(1930), and cases therein cited.
4. State v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 355 Mo. 845, 74 S.W. (2d) 348 (1934)
("valuable consideration" test-promise for promise was sufficient).
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nize that the problem involves protection of the public as well as
protection of the profession.'
In Louisiana the practice of law was defined by the legislature in Act 202 of 1932.6 In Meunier v. Bernich,7 the only case
found construing this act, the plaintiff was a claim adjuster and
although not a licensed attorney he engaged in soliciting claims.
In a suit to recover the amount of a fee agreed upon for the collection of a claim, he was successfully met by the defense that
he was illegally practicing law. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court took occasion to note that the Constitution 8 gives to
the Court, either by express provision or necessary intendment,
full authority to regulate the practice of the law. The court then
pointed out that certain legislative declarations in the Act," which
purported to except from the practice of law certain activities of
laymen in securing and settling disputed accounts or claims, were
null and void as an unconstitutional encroachment upon its judicial power. The rest of the statute, however, was upheld as a
legislative enactment passed in aid of the courts' inherent powers.10
Although Act 202 of 1932, section 2 (2), includes in the practice of law the procuring or the drawing in behalf of another of
any documents relating to secular rights, nevertheless, the attending to or caring for one's own business is excepted from the
operation of the Act.", Therefore, using this provision as a guide,
the question raised by the selection or preparation of an instrument of a legal nature is whether the conduct constitutes merely
caring for one's own business as distinguished from acting in behalf of another. This would require deciding the difficult question
of where one's own business ends and another's begins.
In the principal case the court seems to have overreached the
limit to which the practice of law should extend, and to have
rested its decision too heavily upon cases which dealt with a
different though associated problem.1 2 The result will be to complicate unnecessarily many ordinary business transactions.
S. W. J.
5. In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
6. Dart's Stats. (1932) § 443.
7. Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936), noted (1937) 11
Tulane L. Rev. 316.
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art. II, § 2; Art. VII, § 10.
9. La. Act 202 of 1932, § 2(b) (3).
10. Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 578 (La. App. 1936).
11. La. Act 202 of 1932, § 2 (3).
12. Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E. (2d) 288
(1937); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E.
650 (1934).

